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(presented by the Commission) EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
I.  Background 
The present proposal for a directive is the result of  a process which can be summarised as follows: 
The Lamfalussy Report of 19901 highlighted the important systemic risks inherent in payment systems 
which bperate on the basis of  one or more legal types of  payment netting2. The Commission's attention 
was  drawn to  these  matters  by  one of its  advisory  committees on  payment systems, the  Payment 
Systems Technical Development Group. 
In its  March  1992 working document3,  the Commission noted that certain features of the law in a 
number of Member States,  together with the  differences between Member States'  laws  relating to 
payment systems in general, were a source of uncertainties and risks. This view was endorsed by the 
Committee of  Governors of the central banks ofthe EC4• 
Work began on these issues in  a group of government legal experts and central bank representatives, 
chaired by the Commission, early in 1993. The first phase of the work has consisted of establishing an 
inventory of the legal situation in  the areas of payment netting and settlement finality in all  Member 
States, which has led to a more precise identification of these problems. An extensive studys, ordered 
by the Commission and delivered in February 1994, supported these preliminary conclusions. A first 
consultation hearing with the European Credit Sector Industry was held in the spring of 1994. 
In a second phase (since 1994) different solutions have been discussed and examined within the group 
of government  experts.  They  are  listed .under  point 11.3.  A  second  consultation  hearing  with  the 
European Credit Sector Industry was held in October 1995, which confirmed the overall validity of the 
approach. 
In the  light of this  process,  the  Commission has  reached  operational  conclusions,  in particular as 
regards the questions pertaining to settlement fjnality and collateral security. It therefore considers that 
a directive should be proposed. No operational conclusions have been reached relating to  securities 
settlement systems. These issues remain, however, under consideration within the Commission. It may 
be necessary to make a further proposal covering these issues in the future. 
Overall assessment 
The Commission Strategic Programme for the Internal Market clearly identified the establishment of 
effective cross-border payment systems as  one of the few requirements that still need to  be met to 
ensure the functioning of the Internal Market. This requires modernisation of systems, which affects 
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Commission (DG XV), Wilde Saptc- Brussels, February 1994. process is already under way. Moreover a number of  the large value payment systems which primarily 
serve  the  domestic  market  in  their countries  are  increasingly  gaining  member  banks .  from  other 
Member States. 
The legal issues which are the·subject of  the present proposal have an important underlying influence 
on the design of the necessary systems and linkages, both those which are specifically conceived to 
transmit payments across borders and those which have a "cross-border membership". The resolution 
of these issues will provide a valuable foundation of certainty and serve to minimise legal risks of a 
systemic kind, as well as the costs.which such risks entail. 
The need for action  in  this domain is all  the more urgent as progress is  made towards full  Economic 
and Monetary Union. The European Council, meeting in Madrid. on  15 and 16 December, has stressed 
that the payment system's infrastructure needs to be in place so as to ensure the smooth functioning of 
an area-wide money market based on the single currency. 
II.  Subsidiarity assessment 
l.  What arc the objectives of the directive, having regard to Community obligations'! 
The principal objectives are threefold: 
•  to  reduce legal risks associated with participation in payment systems, as was pointed out in  the 
Lamfalussy report of 1990, in particular as regards the legal vaJidity of netting agreements and the 
enforceability of  collateral security; 
•  to ensure that in the Internal Market payments may be made free of impediments, thus contributing 
to  the  efficiency  and  the  cost--effective  operation  of cross-border payment arrangements  in  the 
European Union; 
•  by  taking  into  account  collateral  constituted  for  monetary  policy  purposes,  to  contribute  to 
developing  the  necessary  legal  framework  in  which  the  future  European  Central  Bank  may 
develop its monetary policy. 
The present directive also 
•  leads to further integration of EC banks in the domestic payment systems of other EC States. The 
directive therefore supports the  free  movement of capital  stated in Article  73B  to  73G and  the 
freedom to provide servic~s under Article 59 of  the Treaty; 
•  contributes to the preparation of  the third stage of EMU, for which efficient payment mechanisms 
are indispensable.  · 
2.  Does the action envisaged stem from an exclusive competence of the Community? 
Exclusive competence: Article 1  OOA, in conjunction with Article 7  A. 
2 3.  What are the possibilities of action available to the Community 
A number of  alternatives were considered: 
First, the minimalist approach of developing a solution within the current state of the national laws 
was examined. The question in that context was to examine whether it was possible to design a model 
contract which could be used by members of  a payment system and which could remedy the problems 
concerned. This approach was rejected for two reasons: 
•  This solution concerns only the parties to the contract, while it is  necessary that third parties be 
legally  bound.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  following case:  a  Country  A  bank  participates  in  a 
multilateral netting system with a central settlement agent in Country B. The Country A bank goes 
bankrupt. In that case, the creditors -or the liquidator- of the bankrupt Country A bank, attempting 
to recover part of  their claims against that bank, are likely to challenge the netting agreement under 
Country A law, since that law may  not necessarily recognise multilateral netting.  If such action 
were successful, it could jeopardise the whole netting system.  . 
•  Insolvency law contains so-called "ordre public" rules which can overrule contractually stipulated 
provisions. Even if a payment system agreement stipulated that in case of insolvency of a member 
the payment orders introduced before the  moment of pronouncement of insolvency proceedings 
cannot be  unwound,  a  zero-hour-rule  e.g.,  as  it  exists  in  a  number of Member  States,  would 
overrule that contractual  arrangement.  Consequently,  unwinding could happen,  with potentially 
far-reaching and damaging consequences for the payment system concerned. 
A  second  possible  solution  consisted  of the  private  international  law  approach,  under  which  it  is 
possible to  agree that a payment system established under the  laws of Country A,  a country whose 
commercial  law  recognises  netting  and  whose  bankruptcy  laws  do  not  interfere  with  the  proper 
operation  of payment  systems,  would  be  governed  entirely  - including  all  its  members  from  EU 
countries -·by the laws of country A.  Whether Member State B's law recognises the finality of netting 
applicable to bank B,  or whether that State's insolvency law has provisions "d'ordre public", like the 
zero-hour rule, would no longer be relevant. Such an approach did not in the final analysis, however, 
prove  to  be  attractive.  Ifchosen, it  would  mean  that  the  courts  in  every  Member  State  would  in 
principle need to be in a position to interpret and apply the different branches of law (commercial law, 
insolvency 1aw, etc.) of  all other Member States. Such a solution, at least when standing alone, seemed 
unnecessarily cumbersome. 
A third possibility  was  to  recommend to  the Member States,  without any  binding obligations, the 
necessary modifications  in  their  laws.  This  approach  has  some  procedural  attractions  in  largely 
bypassing the EU legislative process but it would not substantially assist the governments of Member 
States, who would still have to draft and implement any necessary,legislation. From the point of view 
of the financial  institutions  and payment systems, the solution would lack transparency  and  legal 
certainty.  Any  slight  advantage. of proceeding  in  this  way  was  felt  to  be  outweighed  by  the 
disadvantages. 
Therefore, as explained in detail in section I above, a binding instrument is  now deemed both timely 
and necessary. 
4.  Is uniform legislation  necessary or is  a  directive setting out the general objective and 
leaving implementation thereof to the Member States sufficient? 
Uniform legislation  is  not necessary.  A  directive  setting  out the  general  objectives,  as  they are 
outlined hereunder, is sufficient. 
Section I of the directive deals with the~  of the directive and defines the necessary terms; 
3 Section II. of the directive lays down the general principle, the objective of which is to ensure that 
payment nettin&  is  made legally enforceable under all jurisdictions and its  effec~ binding on third 
parties; 
Section III provides  for  the  irrevocability of payment orders  in  accordance  with the rules  of the 
payment system concerned; 
Section IV ofthe directive lays down the general principle, the objective of which is to: 
•  ensure that insolvency proceedings or any other rule or practice do DQ1 have· a retroactive effect on 
the rights and obligations of  participants. 
•  determine  which  insolvency  law  is  applicable  to  the  rights  and  obligations  in  connection  with 
direct  participation  in  a  payment  system  in  the  event  of insolvency  proceedings  against  a 
participant in that payment system. 
Section  V  of the  directive  lays  down  the  general  principle,  the  objective  of which  is  to  insulate 
collateral security from the effects of  the insolvency law of  the Member State of  a failed participant. 
These provisions set out the general objective pursued, thus leaving implementation to  the Member 
States;  where  appropriate,  institutions  are  free  to  determine  the  precise  c6ntents  of these  general 
principles. 
III.  Detailed commentary on the articles 
Article 1 
This  Dircctiw' s main  goal  is  to  n:ducc  th~..:  systemic  risk  assm:iatcd  with  participation  in  Payment 
Systems. There was a general  cons1~nsus that this directive should have the widest scope possible. To 
this  effect,  the  directive  covers  cross-border  payment  systems  as  well  as  domestic  systems. 
Furthermore, it applies to the following two categories: 
•  EC  institutions  which are  participants  in  third country payment systems  and collateral security 
constituted for such a payment system 
•  Third country institutions which participate in an EC Payment System and the collateral security 
constituted in favour of  that payment system 
The inclusion of  the first category in the directive's scope implies that the benefits of  this Directive are 
extended to third country payment :systems as far as their EC participants are concerned. Third country 
payment systems as such are of  course not covered by the directive, but their participants are insofar as 
they are EC institutions within the meaning of Article 2 (i). 
As far as the second category is concerned, the essential interest of its inclusion in the directive's scope 
lies  in  the  fact  that it makes  it possible to  insulate  collateral  security,  pledged by  a  third  country 
institution in anEC Member State, from a possibly universal insolvency law ofthat third country. 
Finally,  with  a  view  to  the  establishment of the  future  European  Central  Bank,  the  pledging  of 
collateral security will increasingly be cross-border. The same problems arise in that respect as in the 
case of  the pledging of collateral in the framework of payments systems. Therefore, the scope of this 
proposal  has  been  extended  to  ~collateral  security,  pledged  in  connection  with  monetary  policy 
operations. 
4 Article 2 
"institution" has been given a wide scope, so.as to include not only credit institutions in the sense or 
· the  first  Banking  Directive,  but also  investment  banks,  giro  and  postal  banks  and  any  other 
undertaking which participates directly in a payment system. 
"payment order" means an instruction given to  carry out a transfer,  be it credit or debit,  by  a book 
entry on the accounts of  a credit institution or of  a central bank. On the accounts of  a credit institution, 
since it is this type of payment system which calls -from a public policy standpoint- for the kind of 
protection which this Proposal for a Directive provides for. On the accounts of  a central bank, is added 
to  anticipate the foreseeable  development of real  time  gross  settlement facilities,  which  necessitate 
movements on the accounts of  the Central Banks. 
"payment system" is defined widely, so  as to include systems, regardless of whether they settle on a 
gross or net basis and of whether they are based on multilateral or bilateral arrangements. Of  course, a 
federation of  payment systems in itself is also covered by the directive. 
Article 3 
Many  payment  systems,  handling  very  large  payments  ("large  value")  or  smaller  values  ("retail") 
depend on the technique known as netting6 or set-off. "Payment netting" is the conversion into one net 
claim  or  one  net  obligation  of claims  and  obligations  resulting  from  payment  orders  which  an 
institution  either  issues  to  one  or  more  other  institutions  or  receives  from  one  or  more  other 
institutions, with the result that only the net claim can be  demanded or the net obligation be owed. 
This has  tJ!e  effect of reducing greatly  the  number of settlement transactions  required  to  process a 
given number of payments. Instead of  settling each payment order individually as it arises during the 
day the banks involved in a netting agreement settle once by paying (or receiving) a single net balance 
to (or from) the other members of  the system. 
The  legal  enforceability  of a  netting  operation  with  institutions  from  different  Member  States 
ultimately depends on the  law of the Member State· of origin of these  institutions.  In  a number of 
Member States netting,  especially multilateral  netting,  is  not  enforceable under the.  current state of 
legislation. If the liquidator of  a failed participant in a payment system were on that basis to challenge 
the netting, this would mean that he  could repudiate the  net settlement debt,  arrived at  by  netting. 
Instead he could insists on payment to him of all the individual underlying amounts originally due to 
that institution. As for the amounts due from the failed institution, they will be claims on paper in the 
insolvency  proceedings  and  unlikely  to  be  met.  This  phenomenon  of repudiating  the  debt  and 
accepting the amounts originally due, is called cherry-picking. The consequence of cherry-picking is 
serious disruption in the payment system at best,  at worst the payment system might  break down 
(systemic risk) and cause in turn the inability of other members in the payment system to meet their 
obligations (knock-on effect) .. 
Therefore, Article 3(1) provides thatnetting is legally enforceable and binding on third parties, even in 
the  event  of the  opening  of insolvency  proceedings,  insofar  as  the  payment  orders  have  been 
introduced into the payment system before the opening of insolvency proceedings. 
Article· 3(2) specifically focuses on the cases in which a participant who realises that bankruptcy is 
becoming  inevitable,  introduces  payment orders  into  a  payment  system  before  the  declaration  of 
6  From the legal point ofview, "netting~' in this sense is the same technique as  is the subject of the proposal for a 
directive on contractual netting. However the latter deals with unmatured obligations, netted on  a bilateral basis 
only, whilst the present initiative concerns payment streams netted bilaterally or multilaterally.  Both  types of 
netting diffe; markedly from the concept of  position netting, as use? in the Capital Adequacy Directive. 
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insolvency in order to remove assets to the detriment Df the creditors. Therefore, this article confirms 
that the directive does not shield fraudulent payment orders from invalidation. Such invalidation will, 
however, not be permitted to occur through the unwinding of the netting operation, something that the 
directive aims to avoid at all costs, but rather outside the payment system, or indeed in a subsequent 
netting cycle (via a reverse order). 
Article 4 
It is commonly agreed that the possibility of a significantly large payment being revoked can generate 
systemic risk, if the revocation occurs during the process leading to settlement in a payment system. It 
would be unacceptable, on the other hand, to disproportionately limit the freedom of  operation and the 
freedom of contract of the various parties to a payment system in attempting to reduce or minimise 
this risk. 
Thus, having recognised that revocation might otherwise lead to an unwinding of settlement, Article 4 
(1) precludes the revocation of a payment order after a contractually agreed time,  not only by  the 
parties  to  the  payment  system  agreement,  but  also  by  third  parties,  e.g.  a  sub  participant.  This 
prohibition  is  important  not only  in  the  case of netting,  but  also  in  the  case of real  time  gross 
settlement arrangements. 
This does not mean, of  course, tlhat a payment order which was not due by the originator, but has been 
introduced into the payment system, is forever lost to him. Articlc4(2) confirms that, if  the originator, 
i.e. a customer, has a right against the beneJiciary to  reclaim an amount that has been introduced into 
the  payment system, such a right is not cancelled, but will only  have to  be  exercised outside of the 
payment system, or by a reverse payment operation in the next netting cycle. 
Articles 5 and 6 
Irrespective of whether a payment  syste~ operates on  the  basis  of netting or gross-settlement, the 
different insolvency laws in the different Member States cause further problems, where rules "d'ordre 
public" included in these insolv1:;:ncy laws would lead to the possibility of cherry-picking, with its very 
damaging consequences, as deseribed above. 
This is the case for the so called -"zero-hour" rule, which gives retroactive effect to the pronouncement 
of insolvency. A consequence of  this rule is that payment orders introduced after zero hour of the. day 
o~pronouncement  of insolvency of  a participant in a payment system but before the pronouncement of 
. the insolvency, could be challenged by a liquidator of an insolvent institution. The latter would then 
be in a position to insist on payment to him of  all the individual underlying amounts originally due to 
that institution. As for the amounts due from the failed institution, they will be claims on paper in tht~ 
insolvency proceedings and unlikely to be met.  In order to avoid this possibility, Article 5 provides 
that insolvency proceedings do not have retroactive effect. 
There may,  however, exist other provisions "d'ordre public", beyond the so called zero-hour rules, 
which can potentially lead to c:herry-picking. This is why Article 6 has been designed as  a catch-all 
provision, which is to cover all those cases which have not been identified but are believed to exist. 
Therefore, Article 6 states that "in the event of insolvency proceedings against an institution which 
participates directly in a payment system, the rights and obligations arising from or in connection with 
participation in that payment system, shall be determined by the insolvency law of the country where 
the  payment system  is  located."  In  practice,  Article  6  does,  of course,  not  imply  that  a  separate 
insolvency proceeding has to be opened in the Member State of location of the payment system. The 
insolvency of a member institution would continue to fall  under the insolvency law of the Member 
State where that institution is established, as is currently the case. If the liquidator, however, would 
wish to  draw on insolvency  provisions  "d'ordre public"  to  challenge a payment made through the 
6 payment system, he  would have to  apply the insolvency law  uLt.h\~  _  _Mtmbcr StaW.J.!Lfuc_utiunJJLtlw 
payment system. This approach has the advantage that the parties in  a payment system only have to 
examine ~  insolvency  law,  namely  the  insolvency  law of the Member State of location of the 
payment system, instead of having to  examine and attempt to reconcile the  insolvency  law of the 
Member  State of origin of every  single  participant.  This  would contribute  to  reducing  costs  and 
eliminating legal uncertainty. 
Article 7 
Finally,  the  directive  addresses  the  problems  associated  with  collateral  security  which  supports 
participation in payment systems, on a cross-border basis. Its objective is to avoid a situation where in 
the case of insolvency of a participant in a payment system, the insolvency law of that participant's 
Member State would not recognise the validity of collateral security constituted in another Member 
State. Article 7(1) therefore provides that, in the case of insolvency of a participant, the rights of the 
pledgee shall not be affected by the  insolvency of that participant.  This rule  is justified for  public 
policy  reasons.  Vast  sums  are  transferred  through  the  payment  systems  on  a  daily  basis:  if one 
member were not able to meet its obligations and  the collateral could not be realised, this could  -if1 a 
worst case scenario- have disastrous  consequc'nc~:s for  the payment system as such, causing no  less 
than the collapse of  such a system, with a devastating knock-on effect in financial markets. 
It should be pointed  out that this  Proposal  does  not  alter the  rule  of law applicable  to  collateral 
security. This remains, as is the current situation, the law of the Member State where the collateral is 
located, in accordance with the principle of  lex rei sitae. 
In its second paragraph, Article 7 provides that in the case of a universal third country insolvency law, 
the effects of  that law do not extend to the rights of the pledgee in connection with participation in a 
payment  system  or  in  connection  with  monetary  policy  operations,  if that  collateral  security  Is 
constituted in a Member State. 
7 DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ANO 
COUNCIL DIRE:CTIVE ON SETTLEMENT FINALITY AND 
COLLATERAL SECURITY 
8 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 1  OOA 
thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the European Monetary Institute, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the Economic and Social Committee, 
In  accordance  with  the  procedure  laid  down  in  Article  189b  of the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European Community, , · 
Whereas the Lamfalussy report of 1990 to the Governors of  the central banks of  the Group of  Ten 
Countries demonstrated the important systemic risk inherent in payment systems which operate 
on the basis of one or more legal types of payment netting, be it bilateral or multilateral, on the 
one hand; whereas the reduction of legal  risks associated  ~ith participation in real  time gross 
settlement payment systems is of paramount importance, given the increasing development of 
these systems, on the other; 
Whereas the reduction of systemic risk regards in particular the  finality  of settlement and the 
enforceability of collateral security; whereas collateral security is meant to  comprise all means 
provided by a participant to  the other participants in the payment system. to  secure rights and 
obligations in connection with that payment system including, among other means, repurchase 
agreements, insurance contracted by a participant in a payment systems for the benefit of the 
other participants; 
Whereas, by ensuring that payments and movement of capital may be made free of impediments 
in  the  Internal  Market,  the  present  directive  contributes  to  the  efficient and  the  cost-effective 
operation of cross-border payment arrangements  in  the  European  Union;  whereas the directive 
thereby follows  up the progress made towards completion of the internal market,  in  particular 
towards the freedom to provide services and liberalization of capital movements, with a view to 
the realisation of  economic and monetary union; 
Whereas the present directive is intended to cover payment systems of  a domestic as well as of a 
cross.:.border nature; whereas debit as well as credit transfers are covered; whereas the directive is 
applicable to EC payment systems and collateral security constituted by their participants, be they 
EC  or third  country participants,  in connection ·with ·participation in these  payment systems; 
whereas  the  directive  also  covers  EC  institutions which participate  in third  country  payment 
systems; whereas financial flows are increasingly taking place on a world-wide level; whereas EC 
institutions and EC payment systems thus are bound to. establish and maintain close operational 
links  with  third  country  payment  systems  and to  participate  in  them;  whereas  it  is  essential, 
therefore, that the cross·border relations between EC institutions and EC payment systems on the 
one hand and third country payment .systems on the other are addressed and facilitated by this 
directive with a view to avoiding impediments for EC  institutions to participate in third country · 
payment systems arising from a of lack of legal security; whereas efficient EC payment systems 
are  vital  for  the  Internal  Market  and  cannot  operate  properly  without  links  to  third  country 
payment systems because financial markets are inextricably connected with one another; Whereas  the  directive,  by  covering collateral  security  provided  in connection with monetary 
policy operations, assists the EMI in its task of  promoting the efficiency of  cross-border payments 
with a view to  the preparation of the third stage of economic and monetary union and thereby 
contributes to  developing the necessary legal framework in which the future European Central 
Bank may develop its monetary policy; 
Whereas the purpose of  the present directive is to ensure that" netting is legally enforceable under 
all Member States' jurisdictions and binding on third parties; whereas the purpose of  the directive 
is also to ensure that payment orders cannot he revoked after a contractually agreed time; whereas 
the directive aims at securing that insolvency proceedings do not have a retroactive effect on the 
rights  and  obligations  of particilpants;  whereas  the  present  directive  furthermore  aims  at 
determining -in the event of insolvency proceedings against a participant in a payment system-
which insolvency law is applicable to that part of  the insolvency which the rights and obligations 
in connection with directpartieipation in that payment system are; whereas the present directive 
finally intends to insulate collateral security from the effects of the insolvency law applicable to 
the failed participant; 
Whereas  the  present  Directive  also  applies  to  the  relationship  between  an  institution  and  a 
member  of a payment system  which  transfers  the  payment  orders of such  institution  to  the 
payment system, given that this relationship can be considered in itself to be a separate payment 
system; 
Whereas the adoption of the present directive constitutes the most appropriate way of realising 
the above objectives; whereas the present proposal is nessary to realise these objectives and does 
not go beyond the goal of  realising these objectives; 
HA  VEADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
l. SCOPE and  DEFINITIONS 
Article 1-Scgpe 
The provisions of  this directive shall apply to : 
(1)  any EC payment system operating in any currency and the ECU and to collateral security 
provided in connection with participation in such a system. 
(2)  any  EC  institution  which  participates directly  in a third  country payment system  and  to 
collateral security provided in connection with participation in such a system. 
(3)  collateral security provided in connection with monetary policy operations. Artide 2- D({initions 
For the purpose of  this directive: 
(a)  "institution" means any undertaking as defined in Article 1 of  Council Directive 77/780/EEC 
including the institutions set out in the list in Article 2(2) thereof, which participates directly 
in a payment system, and any other undertaking which participates directly in a payment 
system; 
(b)  "direct" participation means participation in a payment system entailing responsability for 
settlement; 
(c)  "EC institution" means any institution which has its registered office in a Member State; 
(d)  "third country institution" means any institution which is not an EC institution; 
(e)  "payment order" means any instruction to place at the disposal of  a final recipient an amount 
of  money by means of  a book entry on the accounts of  a credit institution or a central bank; 
(f)  "insolvency  proceedings"  means any  measure which,  for  reasons of impending or actual 
inability  to· meet  financial  obligations,  is  pronounced  by  a  judicial  or  administrative 
authority  for  the  benefit of a  collectivity of creditors, and which precludes from making 
payments or disposing of  property; 
(g)  "payment netting" means the conversion into one net claim or one net obligation of claims 
and obligations resulting from payment orders which an institution either issues to one or 
more other institutions or receives from one or more other institutions, with the result that 
only the net claim can be demanded or the net obligation be owed; 
(h)  "payment  system"  means  any  written  agreement  between  two  or more  institutions  for 
executing payment orders; 
(i)  "EC  payment system"  means  a  payment system  located  in  a  Member State.  A  payment 
system shall be deemed to be located in the Member State the law of  which has been chosen 
by  the  institutions  which  participate directly  in  that  payment  system.  In  the  absence of 
choice, the payment system shall be deemed to be located in the Member State where the 
settlement takes place; 
G)  "third country payment system" means any payment system which is not an EC payment 
system; 
(k)  "monetary  policy  operation"  means  an  outright  (spot  and  forward)  buying  and  selling-
operation in the financial markets or such an operation under a repurchase agreement, or 
lending or borrowing of claims and marketable instruments, whether in Community or in 
non-Community currencies or in precious metals, by a Member State Central Bank or by the 
future European Central Bank; it also means the conduct of credit operations: by a Member 
State Central Bank or by the future European Central Bank, with credit institutions or other 
market participants, with lending being based on adequate collateral; 
.M (I)  "collateral sccutily"  means  all  a-;scts,  provided  for  the  purpose of securing rights  and 
obligations potentially arising in a payment system or provided to Member State Central Banks or 
to the future European Central Bank in connection with monetary policy operations. 
II. FlNALITYofPAYMENT  NETTING 
(1)  Payment netting is legally enforceable and shall, even in the event of  inso~vency ,prqceedings 
against any institution which ·participates -directly in a payment system, be binding on third 
parties, pr0vided that the payment order was entered. inw the  payment system before the 
opening ofins0lvency proceedings. The moment .of entrance Shall be defined by the rules of 
that payment system. 
(2)  Any rule on the setting aside of  contracts and transactions entered into before the opening of 
insolvency proceedings, .shall llGt lead to the w~g  .ofthe:flettiDg. 
(l)  A payment order may not be revoked either by an institution Which participates directly in a 
payment system or a third party as against the  other direct participants in that payment 
system after the moment defined by the rules of that payment system.  This rule applies 
notwithstanding the opening .ofinsolvency proceedings. 
(2)  Any right which the originator of  a payment order might  have to a refund shall be exercised 
without prejudice to paragraph 1. 
W. NON-KETROACTfVITYtmd  APPLICABLE INSOLVENCY LAW 
Arlicle  5-NM-B.etroactivity 
Insolvency proceedings shall not have retroactive effects on the rights and obligations of an 
institution in connection with direct participation in an EC payment system. Any other rule or 
practice which .has a retroactive effect shaH ee superseded. In  the  event of insolvency  proceedings against an  institution  which participates directly  in  a 
payment system, the rights and obligations arising from or in connection with direct participation 
- in that payment system,  shall be determined by the insolvency  law of the country where the 
payment system is located. 
V. INSULATION of  the RIGHTS of  the PLEDGEE 
from the EFFECTS of  the INSOLVENCY of  the PLEDGER 
Article 7-InS,ulation from the (/feels ofinsolvencv 
(1)  . The rights of a pledgee in connection with liabilities of  one participant to one or more other 
participants in a  payment system or the rights of monetary authorities to  whom  collateral 
security  has  heen  pledged  in  connection  with  monetary  policy  operations,  shall  not  be 
afl:ected  by  the  opening  of insolvency  proceedings  against  the  pledger.  The  collateral 
security shall be realised for the satisfaction of rights in connection with participation in a 
payment system or with monetary policy operations with priority over all  other creditors. 
(2)  Where  a  third  country  institution  constitutes  collateral  security  in  a  Member  State  in 
connection with participation in an EC payment system or in connection with monetary 
policy  operations,  the  rights  of the  pledget(  shall  not  be  affected  by  the  opening  of 
insolvency proceedings against that third country institution. 
VI. FINAL PROVISIONS· 
Article  8 - ImpletlJentation 
(1)  Member States shall bring into force  the  laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive before 31  December 1998 at the latest. They shall 
immediately inform the Commission. 
(2)  When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive 
or shall be accompanied by such ·reference at the time of their official publication. The 
procedure for such a reference shall. be laid down by the Member States. 
(3)  Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of  the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions which they adopt in the field governed by this Directive. In this 
Communication  Member  States  shall  provide  a  table  of correspondence  showing  the 
national provisions which exist or are introduced in respect of  each article of  this directive. 
Article  9 - RetJort to the European Parliament and the Cotmcil No later than three years after the date mentioned in Article 8(1), the Commission shall present a 
report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  application  of this  Directive, 
acc()mpanied where appropriate by proposals for its revision. 
ArticlelO 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For  the European Parliament  For the Council 
The Presiden1t  The President 
., BUSINESS IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
Proposalfor a European Parliament and Council Directive on 
settlement finality and collateral security 
I.a.  Taking account of the principle of subsidiarity, why is Community legislation necessary 
and wh~t  are its main aims? 
Research carried out on behalf of the Commission by banking lawyers1, together with the analyses 
made by the Commission's working group, confirm that there are crucial differences between the 
laws of the Member States which prejudice the  legal validity of certain key  features of payment 
'systems2. 
One of  the central features of  a sound payment system is that there must be no doubt as to when and 
how  settlement  becomes  final.  In  the  current  situation,  finality  in  a  payment  system  whose 
participants  arc  domiciled  in  different  legal  jurisdictions (as  under  the  Treaty  and  the  Second 
Banking  Directive  will  increasingly  be  the  case)  depends  ultimately  on  the  laws  of the  various 
Member States whose institutions arc members.·  -
Another essential  prerequisite  is  that there must  be  legal  certainty  that  in  the case a participant 
fails  to  meet  its  obligations vis-a-vis  the  payment  system,  the  latter can  realise  the  collateral 
security pledged by  that participant.  In  the current situation, the only  way  to  ensure that,  is  to 
constitute the collateral security under the si:une law as the payment system itself, so as to avoid 
conflicts of  law. This is contrary to the principle of  an Internal Market. 
Legal certainty as to collateral security and as to finality of  settlement can only be achieved if the 
national legis!ations are changed in a similar way in each Member State. The most efficient way of 
achieving this goal is by way of  a directive laying down the necessary minimum standards. 
l.b.  Are there likely to be any wider benefits and disadvantages from the proposal? 
If any  effect  is  to  be expected  for  the  financial  sector,  it  will  be  one  of protection of current 
employment.  The  proposal's  main  goal  is  to  strengthen the  stability  of payment  systems  and 
therewith of inter bank financial relations and to  avoid the  knock-on effects that currently could 
arise in the case of  bankruptcy of  a large participant in a payment system. Consequently, the loss of 
employment that would occur in such a case would be avoided as well. 
2 
The  laws  on  credit  transfers  and  their  settlement  in  Member  States  of the  EU:  Report  for  the  European 
Commission (DG XV), Wilde Sapte- Brussels, 1994. 
The key differences referred to are: 
- settlement finality in netting schemes: different possibilities of  unwinding the settlement; 
- the  effect of insolvency of a participant,  on  netting  schemes:  different powers of liquidators  to  prevent 
settlement occurring or to unwind it; 
- rules on revocation: different rules on the time when a payment order becomes irrevocable Moreover,  the  establishment of a  legal  framework  in order  to  rule  out  the  legal  uncertainty 
associated with cross-border payment systems, is  likely to encourage the  further development of 
these  systems.  The  consequent  increase  in  the  VOl\lmC  of business  might  therefore  generate  ~. 
employment. 
I.e.  Were alternative proposals considered, and with what outcome (e.g.  codes of conduct, 
voluntary arrangements)? 
As  explained under  II.  3 of the  explanatory  memorandum,  a  number of other possibilities  were 
considered, but these were abandoned for the reasons exposed. 
2.  Who will be affected by the proposal? 
Which sector of business? What are the size classes and what is the total employment? 
The proposal will be applicable to any undertaking which participates directly in a payment system. 
In practice, the large majority of  these undertakings will he credit-institutions. 
Are there any significant feature:s of the business sector, e.g. dominance by a limited number 
of large firms? 
The main feature of this sector is  the  hitherto lack of integration of payment systems at European 
level.  , 
Are there implications for very small businesses, the craft sector or the self-employed? 
Although  small  businesses are very unlikely  to  constitute a  payment system  among  themselves, 
such a system would be covered by the Directive. However, as end-users of payment systems, they 
will  benefit from  the proposal and!  its effect of elimination of legal risks,  increased efficiency and 
reduction of  costs. These remarks apply equally to the craft sector and the self-employed. 
Arc  there  particular  geographical  areas  in  the  Community  where  these  businesses  are 
located? 
No. 
3.  What will businesses have to do to comply with the proposal? 
What will be the compliance costs? 
No costs other than the legislative ones are to be expected. 
Are there other administrative procedures or forms to complete? 
No. 
Are licenses or marketing authorisations required? 
No. 
Will fees be charged? 
No. 4.  What economic effects, costs and benefits is the proposal likely to have? 
.  On employment? 
Within the payment systems industry, the net effect, if  such effect is to be expected at all, sho1,1ld be 
positive. Within the segment of SMEs, employment benefits are expected (more efficient payment 
services =>  widening of  intra-EO trade potential => contribution to growth and higher employment 
=>greater and more specialised demand for efficient payment services, etc.). 
On investment and the creation or start up of new businesses? 
Marginal effect, if  any. 
On  the  competitive  position  of businesses,  both  in  the Community  and  third  countries' 
markets? 
The efficiency gains and reductions in costs for  business within the Community will  be positive 
(See  paras.  1 and  4  above).  Third  country  businesses  will  benefit from the  advantages  of this 
Directive inside the Community to the same extent as Community businesses do. 
The unilateral extension of the benefits of this Directive to third country payment systems, e.g. the 
. protection  against  undue  revocation,  the  protection  against  retroactive  effects  of  insolvency 
proceedings and the insulation of collateral security from foreign insolvency laws, will also benefit 
third country payment systems. Community businesses will indirectly benefit from the advantage of 
the extension of  the Directive's scope to the EC participants of  the third country payment systems. 
Therefore, no distortion of  competitiveness is to  be expected. 
On public authorities for implementation? 
"Legislative costs of  passing the necessary domestic legislation. 
Are there other indirect effects? 
No. 
What are the costs and benefits of the proposal? 
•  . costs: no costs, other than the legislative ones are to be expected. 
•  benefits: 
-elimination  of legal  risks  associated  with  participation  in  payment  systems,  leading  to  more 
efficient and cost-effective operation of  EC payment systems 
-completion of the Internal Market: the proposal will also facilitate the access by banks from one 
EC Member State,  into  the  payment systems of another EC  Member State  (remotely or via  a 
branch). 
-further integration of  the EC financial sector, both domestically and cross-border, thus contributing 
to the free movement of  capital and to the freedom of  cross-border services. 
-cross-border use of collateral  securities is facilitated.  This contributes to  the free movement of 
capital, ,to  the  freedom  of cross-border  services,  to  the  development  of securities  markets,  to 
developing the necessary legal framework in which the future European CentralBahk may develop 
its monetary policy. 
•  balance: overwhelmingly positive on the benefit side. 5.  Impact on SMEs. Does the proposal contain measures to take account of the specific 
effect on SMEs - ifn.,t, why not? Are reduced or different requirements appropriate? 
No. No direct effect on SMEs. 
Consultation 
6.  Indicate at what stage the consultations were undertaken and the date of publication of 
the prior notification of an intent to introduce legislation? 
The Commission has, over many years, promoted the fullest consultation of all  interested parties 
and earliest disclosure of its line of  policy in this ar~a. This has materialised in the following steps: 
-Green Papcr3  (consultation paper) of September  1990,  calling lor commei1ts  from  all interested 
parties; annexed to the Green Paper was a decision to set up two consultative groups; 
-setting  up  of two  permanent  consultative  groups  on  payment  systems  in  March  1991,  with 
intensive  frequency  of meetings throughout  1991  and  early  1992,  leading  to  reports  to  the 
( 'ommission (in February 1992) published in March  1992; 
-Commission working document of March 19924,  based on the detailed reports of  these consultative 
groups, announcing the Commission's proposed policy, induding intent to  introduce legislation in 
this respect. 
Furthermore, two consultative hearings with representatives of the European Credit Sector Industry 
were held in the spring of 1994 and October 1995, at key stages of the preparatory work leading to 
the present proposal (see Section I above; background). 
List of organisations which have been consulted about the proposal and set out in detail their 
main  views,  including their concerns and  ob,jections  to  the  final  proposal.  \Vhy  is  it  not 
possible or desirable to acced'~ their concerns? 
European  credit  sector  associations  :  The  European  credit  sector  associations  have  been 
consulted throughout. Two "hearings" have taken place with the Commission and its working party, 
the latest in October 1995. There is an overall support for this proposal, which is deemed essential 
by the sector itself. 
Government  experts,  including  representatives  of  the  EC  central·  banks:  Governments 
representatives which were members of the Commission's working group, take a positive stand on 
this proposal. There are differences on some technical  issues, which it is  not possible to resolve 
entirely within the working group. The main point at issue is that some delegations wished to have 
an  (even  more)  ambitious  approach,  covering  so  called  "securities  settlement"  or  "obligations 
netting". 
EMI: a representative of  the EMI has been present in the working group as an observer. 
Were the SME Business Organisations formally consulted? If  not, why not? 
No.  However, SMEs and Retailer organisations were kept regularly informed of progress being 
made, through their representatives in the Commission's consultative groups on payment systems. 
Discussion paper on "Making payments in the Internal Market", COM(90)447. 
4  "Easier cross-border payments: breaking down the barriers", SEC(92) 621  of 27 March  1992 Monitoring and Review 
7.  Explain how the effects and compliance costs of .the pr9posai will  be monitored and 
reviewed.:Ho:ftr wiit'coniphiints be dealt with?  Ca~l  th~  propo!uil~ tiilce it is legislation, be 
~mended  easily?  ·  ,  ·  .  · ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
The proposal contains in its Article 9  an undertaking on the part of the Commission to report on 
these matters to the European Parliament and Council. The necessary preparation for this will  be 
done by the Commission acting with its existing two consultative groups on payment systems. 
There is no comitology procedure, therefore amendments to the proposal, once this is adopted, will 
require normal·legislative procedures. 
Contact point 
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